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The Last-Minute Account Change: How Two Phone Calls Can Stop Invoice Fraud

Intercept IT
The Last-Minute Account Change: How Two Phone Calls Can Stop Invoice Fraud

Photo: Francisclarke, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Most invoice fraud does not arrive with a dramatic bang. It arrives as a polite email from a supplier you already pay, saying the bank has changed and could you update your records before Friday's payment run? The invoice number is real. The timing is good. The logo looks right. And that is exactly why it works.

The scam that waits for a real invoice

The bank-detail change scam is not usually a random blast. Criminals get into a supplier's mailbox, or a shared inbox, and quietly watch. They see invoices going out, payment dates being discussed, and the finance contact's tone of voice. Then they step in at the point where a legitimate invoice is about to be paid.

The email says the old account is being retired, or the bank has merged, or the finance team has moved. There may be a PDF on letterhead. There may be a reply chain that looks convincing because it is a reply chain. The request feels administrative, not dramatic. That is the point.

For a UK small business, the damage can be immediate. Faster Payments land quickly and are not designed to be reversed on request. If your team authorised the payment, the bank may not put the money back. Recovery becomes a race involving your bank, the receiving bank, Action Fraud and a lot of hope.

Email confirmation is not verification

The weakest link in most payment processes is the phrase 'but they confirmed it by email'. Email is the fraudster's home turf. If they have access to the supplier's mailbox, they can read your reply and answer it. If they have spoofed the display name, the message can look right at a glance. If they have registered a lookalike domain, the address may be only one character different.

Even a phone call is not automatically safe if the number came from the suspicious email signature. Fraudsters can set up numbers, redirect calls or simply answer with a confident 'finance here'. The verification has to happen outside the channel that raised the request.

The two-call rule, in plain English

Make this a standing rule: any request to change bank details triggers two phone calls on numbers you already hold. Not numbers in the email. Not numbers from the attachment. Numbers from your supplier contract, your accounts system, a previous verified record or the supplier's main website.

Call one should go to the supplier's main switchboard or finance team. Ask for someone who can confirm the change. Call two should go to your usual account contact or another known person at the supplier. Both calls need to confirm the new account details, including the account name, not just the sort code and account number.

Write down who you spoke to, when, and what they confirmed. If either call cannot be completed, the payment waits. A voicemail saying 'yes, that's us' is not a confirmation. A quick email after the call is not a confirmation either. Two live conversations with two known contacts is the standard.

This feels slightly awkward the first time. Good. Awkward is cheaper than a fraudulent payment.

Put a fence around the payment run

A rule only works if the payment process gives it room. Set a cut-off for bank-detail changes: anything received within, say, 48 hours of a payment run automatically moves to the next cycle. That removes the artificial urgency that fraudsters rely on.

Use dual approval for new payees and changed bank details. One person can set up the change; a different person approves it. Neither person should be able to do both. Keep the call log with the approval record so there is a clear trail.

Check the account name against the supplier's legal name. Be wary of a request that keeps the supplier name but changes only the sort code and account number, or one that asks you to pay a different company entirely. Those are not automatic red flags on their own, but they are reasons to slow down.

Brief the team without turning it into a lecture

Most staff do not need a deep briefing on payment controls. They need one sentence they can use: 'I cannot update bank details from an email; I will call you on the number we hold.'

Tell them what urgency looks like in practice: messages that arrive late on a Friday, just before month-end, or while the usual contact is on leave. Tell them that 'please keep this between us' is not a normal finance request. And make it clear that only the finance team changes payee details, no matter who forwards the email.

If the money has already gone

Call your bank immediately and ask about recalling the Faster Payment. Report it to Action Fraud. Preserve the emails and any call records. Tell the supplier, because their mailbox may be compromised and other customers may be receiving the same message.

But the better outcome is the boring one: the change request arrives, the two calls get made, one detail does not add up, and the payment simply waits. No drama, no loss, no weekend spent on the phone to the bank. Two phone calls are a small price for that.

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