Intercept IT All articles
Cybersecurity

Your Domain, Their Send Button: A 20-Minute Spoofing Check for UK SMEs

Intercept IT
Your Domain, Their Send Button: A 20-Minute Spoofing Check for UK SMEs

Photo: Francisclarke, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Most SME email security chats start with phishing. Fair enough. But there is a quieter question worth asking: can someone else send email that looks like it comes from your domain? Not a lookalike with a swapped letter, but your actual domain in the From line. If the answer is yes, a customer could get a very convincing payment-change request from 'you' and have little reason to doubt it.

The good news is that you can check this in about 20 minutes. You do not need to become a DNS administrator. You need to know what good looks like, what the common gaps are, and what to ask your IT supplier or registrar to fix.

What you are actually checking

Email authentication is three records working together. SPF lists which servers are allowed to send mail for your domain. DKIM adds a cryptographic signature to messages so receivers can check the message was not altered. DMARC tells receiving mailboxes what to do when SPF or DKIM fails, and whether the visible From address lines up with the domain you own.

The important bit for a UK SME is DMARC. Without it, SPF and DKIM are useful, but they are not a clear instruction. With it, you are telling the world: here is my policy, here is where to send reports, and here is what to do when someone tries to pretend to be us.

A DMARC record that says p=none is not protection. It is monitoring mode. It asks receivers to send reports about failures but not to block or quarantine anything. Plenty of organisations have this and assume the job is finished. It is not. p=none is a sensible starting point, especially if you have lots of legitimate senders, but it should have a date on it and a plan to move on.

The 20-minute check

Open a public DNS lookup tool. MXToolbox, Google Admin Toolbox Dig, or your registrar's DNS panel will all do. You are looking at public records, so there is nothing risky about this. Your .co.uk registration and your DNS hosting are two different things, by the way. Nominet runs the registry, but the records usually live with whoever hosts your DNS.

First, look up the TXT record on your root domain. You are looking for something beginning v=spf1. It should end with -all or ~all. A +all or ?all is weak. Also check the includes. If there are more than 10 DNS lookups in the SPF record, it can break, and broken SPF is worse than no SPF because it creates confusing results.

Second, check DKIM. You need the selector name from your email provider. Microsoft 365 often uses selector1 and selector2; Google Workspace commonly uses google. Look up selector._domainkey.yourdomain.co.uk. You want a TXT record containing a public key. If it is missing, DKIM signing is probably not switched on. If you do not know the selector, ask your IT supplier. This is a normal question.

Third, check DMARC. Look up _dmarc.yourdomain.co.uk. You want a TXT record with v=DMARC1, a policy of p=quarantine or p=reject, a reporting address in rua=mailto, and ideally pct=100. If it says p=none, note it. If there is no record at all, note that too. Also look for sp=, which sets policy for subdomains. If you do not send email from subdomains, you can usually be stricter there than on the main domain.

One more thing: SPF and DKIM can pass for a different domain and still fail DMARC alignment. That is why the policy matters. It is not enough for a sending service to authenticate; it has to authenticate as your domain.

What p=none really means

In plain English, p=none says: please tell me about messages that fail, but do not act on them. Receivers may still deliver a spoofed message to your customer's inbox. It does not stop invoice fraud, supplier impersonation, or a fake 'updated bank details' email.

That is why the question to ask your IT supplier is not 'do we have DMARC?' It is 'what is our DMARC policy, when was it last reviewed, and who reads the reports?' If the answer is p=none and nobody has looked at the reports since it was set up, you have a monitoring record, not a control.

The practical path is usually: get reporting working, find all legitimate senders, fix DKIM and SPF, then move to quarantine, then reject. A few weeks of monitoring is normal. Leaving it there for years is not.

The spoofing gap people miss

DMARC protects the From domain when it is enforced. It does not stop every impersonation. A fraudster can still create a free webmail account, set the display name to 'Accounts - Your Company', and send from a random address. DMARC will not stop that because the actual domain is not yours.

You also need to think about lookalike domains: yourcompany.co.uk versus yourcompany.com, or your-company.co.uk with a hyphen. Those are separate registrations and separate risks. The 20-minute check is about whether your own domain can be used against you. It is not the whole of anti-impersonation, but it is the bit you can verify today.

A short list to send your IT supplier or registrar

Copy this into an email and ask for a written response. Keep it specific.

What to do with the answers

If records are missing, do not panic. Prioritise. First, get DMARC reporting switched on so you can see legitimate senders and any spoofing attempts. Then fix DKIM and tighten SPF. Then move the policy to quarantine, and later to reject. Keep a simple change log so you know who changed what and when.

As of November 2026, the lookup tools are free and the records are public. You can do the first pass yourself in 20 minutes. The value is not in becoming technical. It is in being able to ask a short, specific question and get a short, specific answer before a customer rings you about an invoice that was never yours.

You do not need a 40-page report. You need a policy, a date, and a named owner.

All Articles

Related Articles

Your Meeting Room Is Oversharing: The Calendar Permissions Check Most SMEs Miss

Your Meeting Room Is Oversharing: The Calendar Permissions Check Most SMEs Miss

The Kettle, the Camera and the Printer: What Else Is Sitting on Your Office Wi-Fi?

The Kettle, the Camera and the Printer: What Else Is Sitting on Your Office Wi-Fi?

Who Reads sales@ Now? The Shared Inbox Audit Your SME Hasn’t Done

Who Reads sales@ Now? The Shared Inbox Audit Your SME Hasn’t Done